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Filing # 57034137 E-Filed 05/30/2017 10:25:36 AMIN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE TWELFTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FORSARASOTA COUNTY, FLORIDA CIVILACTIONMAJOR TRIAL DIVISION TJAMES A. ARMOUR, 4449 HOLDINGS, LLC,a Florida Limited Liability Company,Plaintiffs,V. Case No. 2010 - CA - 000046 - NCDAVID G. KARINS, an individual, KARINSENGINEERING GROUP, INC., a FloridaCorporation, J.T. FEENEY, INC. D/B/A JOHNFEENEY ROOFING, a Florida Corporation,W.R. GRACE & CO., a Foreign Corporation,Defendants.PLAINTIFFS’ AMENDED RESPONSE TODEFENDANT?’S, KARINS ENGINEERING GROUP,INC., MOTION FOR JUDGMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITHMOTIONS FOR DIRECTED VERDICT ON COUNTS III AND IVPLAINTIFFS, JAMES A. ARMOUR, INDIVIDUALLY, and as TRUSTEE OF THEBAY SHORE ROAD TRUST U/A/D OCTOBER 1, 2008, 4449 HOLDINGS, LLC, and THEBAY SHORE ROAD TRUST U/A/D OCTOBER 1, 2008 (collectively “Armour’), herebyrespond to DEFENDANT’S, KARINS ENGINEERING GROUP, INC. (“KEG”), Motion forJudgment in Accordance with Motion for Directed Verdict on Counts III and IV, dated May 8,2017 (“Motion”), as follows:BACKGROUNDl, The issues raised by KEG in its Motion were previously addressed by the Court atthe close of Armour’s case and at the close of all evidence. At that time, KEG moved fordirected verdict as to Counts III (Professional Negligence) and IV (Building Code Violations).Filed 05/30/2017 10:28 AM - Karen E. Rushing, Clerk of the Circuit Court, Sarasota County, FLThe Court reserved ruling on KEG’s motions for directed verdict, and on April 21, 2017, the juryreturned a verdict in favor of Armour on Counts HI and IV. Through its Motion, KEG requeststhe Court to set aside the jury verdict as to Counts III and IV.2. KEG argues in its Motion that the jury verdict should be set aside because: (1)there is no evidence of the professional standard of care pertaining to a structural engineers’certifications or deviation from such standard (Count ITI); and (1) there is no evidence that KEGviolated the Building Code (Count IV).3, However, KEG mischaracterizes the evidence introduced at trial. For example:(i) the Karins Letters dated September 8, 2008, September 11, 2008, and September 29, 2008(the “Code Plus Letters”) clearly set the standard of care for KEG; (11) there was trial testimonyregarding the standard of care; and (1) Armour sought to introduce a rebuttal expert, which theCourt excluded, who disputed Mr. Bracken’s claim that there was nothing in the Code PlusLetters authored by KEG that fell below the required standard of care.THE CODE PLUS LETTERS4, KEG’s letter to Howard Jacobs, dated September 8, 2008 (“KEG’s FirstLetter”), provides, in relevant part, as follows:Karins Engineering Group, Inc. (CEG) has performed structuralengineering services for the Jacobs Residence including design offoundations and structural components, design of site and grading,inspection of structural component construction, andmiscellaneous consulting on waterproofing and other buildingcomponent issues.KEG hereby certifies that the residence meets or exceeds allstructural requirements of the Florida Building Code, 2004Edition (current at the time of construction) as well as thestructural and site requirements of the Federal EmergencyManagement Admunistration/National Flood Insurance Program(FEMA/NFIP) rules and regulations required by Florida andFlorida Statute. Building foundations, break-away constructionPage 2 of 38below the NFIP flood elevation, site work and grading are alldesigned to perform as specified by rule and regulation.Several features of the residence significantly exceed Coderequirements. One of these features is the construction of thewalls. They are reinforced concrete masonry unit walls withall vertical cells grouted. On the exterior surface of the wallstructure, a drainage plane is created using seli-adheringmembrane, which is appropriately flashed furred and finished.The exterior finish includes a second drainage plane thatconsists of paper-backed wire lath and stucco installedaccording to ASTM C926. All connections of furring, lath andaccessories are designed and specified to resist component andcladding wind loads. Installation of wall components wasinspected by KEG during construction.A second feature is the design of the floors. Floors weredesigned to deflect approximately 1/2 that permissible byCode. The design required to achieve this extra stiffnessresults in a structure also is (sic) capable of resistingsignificantly higher loads than required by Code.A third feature 1s the roofing system. Roof sheathing is 5/8” thickstructural plywood fastened using construction adhesive, screwsand ring-shank nails rather than the Building Code minimum OSBsheathing panels and smooth-shank nails. The waterproofingmembrane includes two layers of fully . self-adheringmembrane.Additional features include but are not limited to the use ofinsulation and subfloor materials to control noise and vibration andto increase efficiency; and the use of a commercial elevator in lieuof a residential elevator.We trust this information is helpful. Should questions arise,please do not hesitate to call. (emphasis added).A true and correct copy of KEG’s First Letter is attached to this Response as Exhibit“495, In addition to the representations contained in KEG’s First Letter, KEG’s letter toHoward Jacobs, dated September 11, 2008 (‘KEG’s Second Letter”), added the followingrepresentations:Page 3 of 38Though not indicated on the structural drawings, KEG herebycertifies that the as-built structural capacities of all structuralcomponents meet or exceed wind loading requirements forMiami Dade County (147 mph wind velocity), including butnot limited to fenestrations, wall cladding assemblies, roof andelevated deck framing components and truss anchorages.Capacities of shearwalls, horizontal diaphragms, columns,foundations and rear glass canopy components significantly exceedwind loading requirements of Miami Dade County.In addition to structural and wind load compliance describedabove, several features of the residence significantly exceedlocal Code requirements. One of these features is theconstruction of the walls. They are reinforced concretemasonry unit walls with all vertical cells grouted. On theexterior surface of the wall structure, a drainage plane iscreated using self-adhering membrane, which is appropriatelyflashed, furred, and finished. The exterior finish includes asecond drainage plane that consists of paper-backed wire lathand stucco installed according to ASTM C926. All connectionsof furring, lath and accessories are designed and specified toresist component and cladding wind loads. Installation of wallcomponents was inspected by KEG during construction.A second feature is the design of the floors. Floors weredesigned to deflect approximately 2 that permissible by Code.The design required to achieve this extra stiffness results in astructure also is (sic) capable of resisting significantly higherloads than required by Code.A third feature is the roofing system. Roof sheathing is 5/8” thickstructural plywood fastened using construction adhesive, screwsand ring-shank nails rather than the Building Code minimum OSBsheathing panels and smooth-shank nails. The waterproofingmembrane includes two layers of fully = self-adheringmembrane.Additional features include but are not limited to the use ofinsulation and subfloor materials to control noise and vibration andto increase efficiency; and the use of a commercial elevator in lieuof a residential elevator.We trust this information is helpful. KEG certifications andsystem characterizations contained herein are based on ourobservations of work-in-progress and analysis. They shall notsupplant the Contractor’s obligation to construct in accordancePage 4 of 38with record documents or any of its other obligations. Shouldquestions arise, please do not hesitate to call. (emphasis added).A true and correct copy of KEG’s Second Letter is attached to this Response as Exhibit“76, In addition to the representations contained in KEG’s First and Second Letters,KEG’s letter to James A. Armour, dated September 29, 2008 (“KEG’s Third Letter’), addedthe following representation:We trust this information is helpful; Mr. Armour may rely on theinformation contained herein. (emphasis added).A true and correct copy of KEG’s Third Letter is attached to this Response as Exhibit“39ARGUMENTL. KEG’s Code Plus Letters Clearly Set the Standard of Care for KEG.7. KEG’s Code Plus Letters contained unequivocal representations that wereintended to induce reliance on their contents. By way of example and not limitation, the CodePlus Letters contained the following representations and assertions:(a) “performed... inspection of structural component construction”;(b) “the residence meets or exceeds all structural requirements of the Florida BuildingCode”;(c) “all vertical cells [are] grouted”;(d) The drainage plane “is appropriately flashed furred and finished”;(ec) The “exterior finish includes a second drainage plane that consists of paper-backed wire lath and stucco installed according to ASTM C926”;(f) “Installation of wall components was inspected by KEG during construction”;(g) “the as-built structural capacities of all structural components meet or exceedwind loading requirements for Miami Dade County (147 mph wind velocity)”;Page 5 of 38(h) “KEG certifications and system characterizations contained herein are based onour observations of work-in-progress and analysis”;(i) “Floors were designed to deflect approximately 2 that permissible by Code”;(j) “Mr. Armour may rely on the information contained herein”;8. The record evidence introduced at trial unmistakably showed that therepresentations and certifications in the Code Plus Letters were untrue. Additionally, the trialtestimony demonstrated that the inspections and observations described in the KEG Code PlusLetters never occurred. In fact, David Karins testified that neither he, nor anyone from KEG,performed any of the inspections and observations described in the Code Plus Letters, whichinspections and observations were necessary in order to certify the as-built condition of theArmour residence.9, Armour’s claim against David Karins and KEG is different from a design-relatedprofessional negligence claim against an engineer. The Code Plus Letters contain absolutecertifications that were meant to be relied upon, and in fact were relied upon, by foreseeable thirdparties, including Armour.10. David Karins admits that actual inspections were required in order to verify theas-built condition of the residence and that such inspections never occurred. Relevant portionsof Mr. Karins’ trial testimony is as follows:(Page 4182)l Q What inspections would you need to do inorder to verify the as-built condition of 4449 BayShore Road on September 29th of 2008?A I would have to do the structural limitsof the property, the foundation, the columns, thewalls, the trusses. All of the structural elements.Q For example, you were shown pictures ofsome cut trusses at the barrel attic roof area?A Yes.Q And would you have had to inspect thoseOO NM hb WH NYpom,=Page 6 of 3811 trusses in order to see their as-built condition?12 A Yes.13 Q_ In terms of the mansard roof and its14 attachment to the roof, you would have had to15 inspect it in order to be able to give an opinion on16 its as-built condition?17 A Yes.18 Q You did not do that because the last time19 you were at the Armour residence was May of 2007?20 A That's correct.Trial Transcript, dated March 21, 2017, Vol. 17. (emphasis added). A true and correctcopy of the above excerpt is attached to this Response as Exhibit “4.”ll. The Code Plus Letters attest to the following as-built conditions: “On theexterior surface of the wall structure a drainage plane is created using self-adheringmembrane, which is appropriately flashed furred and finished. The exterior finishedincludes a second drainage plane that consists of paper-back wire lath and stucco installedaccording to ASTM C926.”12. David Karins testified at trial that he did not know whether that statement wastrue because he never made the requisite inspections to confirm the accuracy of the certification.Relevant portions of Mr. Karins’ testimony is as follows:(Page 3721)7 Q_ Next it says, The exterior finish includes a8 second drainage plane that consists of paperback wire9 lath.10 Do you know if that was stainless steel lath11 or was it --12 A I don't know for sure. I believe there was a13. proposal to install stainless lath later on, but that14 that really wasn't the topic of our discussion.Trial Transcript, dated March 20, 2017, Vol. 16. (emphasis added). A true and correctcopy of the above excerpt is attached to this Response as Exhibit “5.”Page 7 of 3813. Mr. Karins further testified as follows:(Page 3729)3 Q Do you know whether the stucco was applied4 that way, yes or no?5 A I believe I just specifically answered that6 question. I do not know if every individual spot is7 applied in a conformance to ASTM C926, because I didn't8 inspect it.Trial Transcript, dated March 20, 2017, Vol. 16. (emphasis added). A true and correctcopy of the above excerpt is attached to this Response as Exhibit “6.”14. David Karins admits that to confirm whether the drainage plane system wasproperly flashed, furred, and finished an inspection was required, which inspection neveroccurred. Mr. Karins testified, in relevant part, as follows:(Page 4184)25 Q_ If you were going to state that the(Page 4185)1 drainage plane system was flashed, furred, and2 installed correctly, what would you have to do?3 A Verify.4 Q And how would you verify?5 A Come to the job site and observing what6 was listed to be in place was actually in place.7 Q You've never looked at any design drawings8 for the drainage plane system?9 A No, I didn't.10 Q You've never made any inspections of the11 drainage plane system?12 A That is correct.Trial Transcript, dated March 21, 2017, Vol. 17. (emphasis added). A true and correctcopy of the above excerpt 1s attached to this Response as Exhibit “7.”15. The Code Plus Letters also certify that the fenestrations, wall cladding assemblies,roof and elevated deck framing components, and truss anchorages meet or exceed the MiamiDade wind loading requirements. The Code Plus Letters provide, in relevant part, as follows:Page 8 of 38Though not indicated on the structural drawings, KEG herebycertifies that the as-built structural capacities of all structuralcomponents meet or exceed wind loading requirements forMiami Dade County (147 mph wind velocity), including butnot limited to fenestrations, wall cladding assemblies, roof andelevated deck framing components and truss anchorages.16. David Karins admitted at trial that KEG never inspected the fenestrations to beable to certify that the as-built conditions met or exceeded the requirements of the FloridaBuilding Code, or the Miami Dade wind loading requirements. Relevant portions of Mr. Karins’trial testimony is as follows:(Page 3727)6 Q_ With respect to the fenestrations in the7 residence, isn't it true that you testified that you did8 zero inspections of the fenestrations?9 A That's true.10 Q Isn't it true that you said your stuff [sic] did not11 do any inspections of the fenestrations?12 A That's true.13 Q Isn't it true that you've testified, under14 oath, that at the time that you wrote these letters, you15 did not know how the stucco had been installed?16 A Well, there was a great deal of testimony over17 the past, what is this 2017, 13 years that I've been18 involved in this project, and the intention of our -- of19 any testimony that I have made 1s that I did not20 specifically know about individual examples of how the21 stucco was installed, but I did have numerous22 discussions with Mr. Voigt and Mr. Jacobs about how to23 install stucco.Trial Transcript, dated March 20, 2017, Vol. 16. (emphasis added). A true and correctcopy of the above excerpt ts attached to this Response as Exhibit “8.”Page 9 of 3817. Mr. Karins further testified as follows:(Page 4063)18 Q_ Sir, you've heard allegations with respect19 to the window and door bucks. Did KEG as an20 engineering group inspect the windows and door21 bucks.22 A We did not inspect the window and door23 bucks.Trial Transcript, dated March 21, 2017, Vol. 17. (emphasis added). A true and correctcopy of the above excerpt is attached to this Response as Exhibit “9.”18. Mr. Karins additionally testified as follows:(Page 4104)2 Q_ And did you, sir, inspect the windows and3 doors and their attachment, waterproofing, before4 signing this document.5 A No.Trial Transcript, dated March 21, 2017, Vol. 17. (emphasis added). A true and correctcopy of above excerpt 1s attached to this Response as Exhibit “10.”19. Mr. Karins also testified as follows:(Page 4179)5 Q Okay. Did you ever inspect windows on6 this project?7 A No.8 Q___ Did you ever inspect doors on this9 project?10 A No, I did not.Trial Transcript, dated March 21, 2017, Vol. 17. (emphasis added). A true and correctcopy of the above excerpt 1s attached to this Response as Exhibit “11.”20. David Karins admitted at trial that KEG never actually inspected the wallcladding assemblies so as to certify that the as-built condition met or exceeded the Miami Dadewind loading requirements. Relevant portions of Mr. Karins’ testimony is as follows:Page 10 of 38(Page 3730)Q Did you inspect the drainage plane systemprior to writing the letter?A I did not inspect the drainage plane systemprior to writing the letters.Q__ Did you look at any of the conduit mechanicalboxes or fenestrations through the drainage plane systemprior to writing the letters?A I did not.Sr~ IA nn kh WwW NTrial Transcript, dated March 20, 2017, Vol. 16. (emphasis added). A true andcorrect copy of the above excerpt is attached to this Response as Exhibit “12.”21, Mr. Karins further testified as follows:(Page 3738)Q Did you personally make any inspections of the3 waterproofing installations?4 A I did not make inspections of the5 waterproofing installations.6 Q__ Did your staff?7 A No.Trial Transcript, dated March 20, 2017, Vol. 16. (emphasis added). A true and correctcopy of the above excerpt is attached to this Response as Exhibit “13.”22. David Karins admitted at trial that KEG never actually inspected the roof andelevated deck framing components, or the truss anchorages so as to certify that the as-builtconditions met or exceeded the Miami Dade wind loading requirements. Relevant portions ofMr. Karins’ testimony is as follows:(Page 4182)10 Q And would you have had to inspect those11 trusses in order to see their as-built condition?12 A Yes.13 Q In terms of the mansard roof and its14 attachment to the roof, you would have had to15 inspect it in order to be able to give an opinion on16 its as-built condition?17 A Yes.18 Q You did not do that because the last timePage 11 of 3819 you were at the Armour residence was May of 2007?20 A That's correct.Trial Transcript, dated March 21, 2017, Vol. 17. (emphasis added). A true and correctcopy of the above excerpt is attached to this Response as Exhibit “14.”23. Mr. Karins further testified as follows:(Page 3791)21 Q Would you agree that there are codes that22 apply to the roof, elevated deck framing components and23 truss anchorages both for Miami-Dade and for Sarasota?24 A Yes.25 Q With respect to the rear glass canopy(Page 3792)1 components, as installed at the Armour residence, would2 you agree that you did not inspect or test that3 installation?4 A Yes.Trial Transcript, dated March 20, 2017, Vol. 16. (emphasis added). A true and correctcopy of the above excerpt is attached to this Response as Exhibit “15.”24. Mr. Karins additionally testified as follows:(Page 3806)2 Q Are the cut trusses at the barrel roof truss3 area, would you agree those are within your inspections?4 A No.5 Q Would you agree that the cut trusses are6 inconsistent with your drawings?7 A Yes. This picture is, yes.Trial Transcript, dated March 20, 2017, Vol. 16. (emphasis added). A true and correctcopy of the above excerpt is attached to this Response as Exhibit “16.”25. The Code Plus Letters further certify that the vertical fill cells have been grouted,as follows: “Several features of the residence significantly exceed Code requirements. One ofthese features is the construction of the walls. They are reinforced concrete masonry unitwalls with all vertical cells grouted.”Page 12 of 3826.David Karins testified at trial that the vertical fill cells were never inspected andthat the certification regarding the fill cells in the Code Plus Letters is not true. Relevantportions of Mr. Karins trial testimony is as follows:(Page 3754)6 Q Atsome point, Karins Engineering stopped7 inspecting the fill cells; is that true?8 A We didn't ever inspect the placement of9 concrete in the fill cells, but we did inspect10 reinforcement steel and the clean-outs.Trial Transcript, dated March 20, 2017, Vol. 16. (emphasis added). A true and correctcopy of the above excerpt is attached to this Response as Exhibit “17.”27,David Karins further testified as follows:(Page 3792)20 Q- What actually existed out at the residence on21 September 29th, 2008, would you agree with me that all22 vertical cells were not, in fact, in the as-built23 condition, grouted?24 A On the as-built drawings, all vertical cells25 are grouted. In the field, I don't know that all1 vertical cells are grouted. I, today, know that some2 were not.3 Q_ And you know, as of today, that on September4 29th of 2008, the as-built condition did not have all5 vertical cells grouted?6 A Is that a different -- did I answer that? I'm7 sorry.8 Q_ I'll try it again directly.9 On September 29th of 2008, isn't it true that10 ‘the as-built condition of the Armour residence did not11 have all vertical cells grouted? That's a yes or no.12 A Yes.Trial Transcript, dated March 20, 2017, Vol. 16. (emphasis added). A true and correctcopy of the above excerpt is attached to this Response as Exhibit “18.”Page 13 of 3828. Paula Barros Peno, KEG’s inspector, testified that in order to be able to providean opinion on, and certify the as-built condition of components of the residence, actualinspections of those components had to occur:(Page 4181)10 Q If you were going to give an opinion on11 the as-built condition of the Armour residence on12 September 29th of 2008, what would you have to do?13 A If I have --14 MR. DeLEO: Objection. Foundation.15 THE COURT: Overruled.16 BY MR. KOESTER:17 Q What would you have to do?18 A To do an opinion as far as what?19 Q_ As-built condition on September 28th of20 2009.21 A I would not know how to respond to that22 question because I'm not a designer.23 Q Of 2008.24 You do do field inspections?25 A Yes.(Page 4182)1 Q What inspections would you need to do in2 order to verify the as-built condition of 4449 Bay3 Shore Road on September 29th of 2008?4 A I would have to do the structural limits5 of the property, the foundation, the columns, the6 walls, the trusses. All of the structural elements.7 Q For example, you were shown pictures of8 some cut trusses at the barrel attic roof area?9 A Yes.10 Q And would you have had to inspect those11 trusses in order to see their as-built condition?12 A Yes.13 Q_ In terms of the mansard roof and its14 attachment to the roof, you would have had to15 inspect it in order to be able to give an opinion on16 its as-built condition?17 A Yes.18 Q You did not do that because the last time19 you were at the Armour residence was May of 2007?20 A That's correct.Page 14 of 38Trial Transcript, dated March 21, 2017, Vol. 17. (emphasis added). A true and correctcopy of the above excerpt is attached to this Response as Exhibit “19.”29. Jeff Parzych, Armour’s expert, testified that to certify an existing condition, youneed to remove the necessary sections of the structure to observe the underlying portions of thestructure. Relevant portions of Mr. Parzych’s trial testimony is as follows:(Page 2708)20 A. To verify the existing conditions, you would have to21 remove sections of the sheathing, stucco, to you allow22 observations of the underlying portions of the structure.23 BY MR. KOESTER:24 Q. With respect to the fill cells, what is your opinion25 on what would have to occur in order to locate and fix the(Page 2709)1 fill cells?2 A. Again, a similar technique. You would have to3 either do destructive testing, removing of the stucco, some of4 the face shell, or have to do an extensive amount of5S nondestructive testing.Trial Transcript, dated March 13, 2017, Vol. 11. (emphasis added). A true and correctcopy of the above excerpt is attached to this Response as Exhibit “20.”30. The Code Plus Letters specifically certify that the structural components of theresidence, such as the roof trusses, met the Miami Dade wind loading requirements. SamGreenberg, a structural engineer employed by Dansco, was responsible for ensuring that thetrusses were properly designed to meet the load specifications provided by KEG.31. Mr. Greenberg provided expert testimony at trial that the only way to verifywhether the design of the trusses met the requirements of the Florida Building Code and theMiami Dade wind loading requirements was by utilizing a software called MiTek.Page 15 of 3832. The relevant portion of Mr. Greenberg’s trial testimony is as follows:(Page 2723)15 Q. So in order to analyze the strength of the truss --16 and we'll use MiTek as an example -- 1f you're using a MiTek17 plate, do you have to use the MiTek software to understandthe18 strength of the truss?19 A. Correct. You've got to use the proprietarysoftware20 that matches the design of the plate.21 Q. Soif you were to use some other type of software,22 you're not going to come up with an accurate evaluation of the23 truss?24 A. If you don't use truss analysis software, you're not25 going to get the right answer.Trial Transcript, dated March 14, 2017, Vol. 12. (emphasis added). A true and correctcopy of the above excerpt is attached to this Response as Exhibit “21.”33. Sam Greenberg further testified that KEG designed the trusses to only meet the130 mph wind load requirements, not the higher Miami Dade wind load requirements. Relevantportions of Mr. Greenberg’s trial testimony are as follows:(Page 2727)9 Q. So Mr. Karins would specify to you -- ultimately10 would specify the wind load requirements, deflection, et11 cetera; is that correct?12 A. All the of the design requirements: which version13 of the building code it was under, the wind speed, the wind14 coefficients, anything that had to do with the design of the15 structure as it related to the trusses.16 Q. Okay. So the original -- what was the wind speed17 for the original truss design?18 A. 130 miles an hour.Trial Transcript, dated March 14, 2017, Vol. 12. (emphasis added). A true and correctcopy of the above excerpt is attached to this Response as Exhibit “22.”Page 16 of 3834. Mr. Greenberg testified that he tested the trusses using the MiTek software andthat the trusses did not meet the higher Miami Dade 147 mile per hour wind load requirements,Relevant portions of Mr. Greenberg’s trial testimony are as follows:(Page 2745)6 Q. And did you evaluate the trusses for compliance with7 the Miami-Dade 147?8 A. Weran the trusses using the MiTek software and9 increased the wind speed from 130 to 147 miles per hour.10 Q. What were results of your evaluation?1] A. Most of the short span trusses, the hip jacks, the12 short trusses under 14 or 15 feet seemed to be okay. It was13 the longer span trusses, those barrel trusses, those were not14 adequate any longer.15 Q. And did you -- why did you use the MiTek softwareto16 make that evaluation?17 A. That's a component and MiTek is the wind. Sothat's18 the obvious program to use when we've already designedthe19 trusses using MiTek to get the wind and the plates.Trial Transcript, dated March 14, 2017, Vol. 12. (emphasis added). A true and correctcopy of the above excerpt is attached to this Response as Exhibit “23.”35. The Code Plus Letters further certify the floor deflection, as follows: “Floorswere designed to deflect approximately '4 that permissible by Code. The design required toachieve this extra stiffness results in a structure also is capable of resisting significantlyhigher loads than required by Code.”36. Mr. Greenberg testified that KEG provided all of the criteria for the design of thefloor trusses, including the desired deflection in accordance with KEG’s design of the structure.Relevant portions of Mr. Greenberg’s trial testimony are as follows:Page 17 of 38(Page 2727)6—~]2425Q. So going back to your original involvement at theresidence, who was the engineer of record at that time?A. I believe Mr. Karins.Q. So Mr. Karins would specify to you -- ultimatelywould specify the wind load requirements, deflection, etcetera; is that correct?A. All the of the design requirements: which versionof the building code it was under, the wind speed, the windcoefficients, anything that had to do with the design of thestructure as it related to the trusses.Q. Okay. So the original -- what was the wind speedfor the original truss design?A. 130 miles an hour.Q. Were there any additional specifications thatMr. Karins had regarding deflection?A. They had a deflection limitation in the plans ofL/500.Q. So help explain to me what "deflection" is and what"L/500" means.A. You would have two supports -- I'm going to use my(Page 2728)fingers as the supports. If you took a yardstick and laid itflat between the two supports, as you load it, it pushesdownward; downward deflection. So you want to limit thatdeflection to the length of the truss, which is "L," ininches. So, argument's sake, it's a 30-foot truss. 30 times12 is 360, divided by 500; that fraction, that's the maximumfraction that you're allowed to deflect. If you exceed that,you've violated the deflection requirement in his drawings.Q. And was his deflection requirement in his drawings ahigher deflection standard than you would typically find?A. Typically for total load in floor systems, you wouldsee L/360 which gives you a larger allowable deflection.Deflections are governed by the building code; it'srecommended for different types of materials.A typical house would be L/360. If you have rigidceilings like a plaster ceiling rather than drywall, or rigidmaterials on a floor like marble or granite, you would want tohave a stiffer, less deflecting floor.Q. And you're aware that the original design intent wasfor stiffer floors in this home?A. Well, I know the deflection was limited. That'swhat the plans called for.Page 18 of 38Trial Transcript, dated March 14, 2017, Vol. 12. (emphasis added). A true and correctcopy of the above excerpt is attached to this Response as Exhibit “24.”37. Mr. Greenberg testified that KEG’s design and construction documents yieldedfloor trusses that were improper for the as-built construction and the change from lightweight tonormal weight concrete further exacerbated the loading and deflection structural deficiencies.Relevant portions of Mr. Greenberg’s trial testimony on the issue are as follows:(Page 2743)24 Q. And do you have an opinion as to whether or not the25 shift from lightweight concrete to normal weight concrete as(Page 2744)1 depicted in that ESI caused the need to do the repairs you2 drew?3 A. Like I said, it increased the loading and the4 deflection, so it needed to be addressed, yes.5 Q. So regardless of the amount of concrete that went6 onto the deck, you needed to address that issue, correct?7 A. Even when you look at the original or prescribed8 construction, the 35 pounds per square foot was not -- of dead9 load was not enough to account for the weight of the pavers,10 and even the lightweight concrete, it was more like 52 pounds11 per square foot was the original actual construction, which12 was in excess of the 35 and then it got increased up to 70.13 So the original trusses as we designed based on the14 information provided in the construction documents was not15 adequate for the actual construction.16 Q. And that -- is that true for all of the decks on the17 second floor?18 A. In particular, that rear deck that had the concrete19 and the pavers. There are other decks that were okay.20 Q. And then we get to, did you do an evaluation21 regarding the third level decks at the home?22 A. Some of them were okay, and some were not okay.23 Q. Okay. And the ones that needed changes were24 reflected in the repair detail?25 A. Correct. Whatever needed to be fixed was fixed or(Page 2745)1 replaced.Page 19 of 38Trial Transcript, dated March 14, 2017, Vol. 12. (emphasis added). A true and correctcopy of the above excerpt is attached to this Response as Exhibit “25.”38. Mr. Greenberg further testified as follows:4This area right here (indicating), is that one of5 the second-floor decks that you were discussing?67A. Here and then over there, I believe.Q. Okay. Do you have an opinion as to whether or not8 those decks met the original design criteria as constructed in9 the field?101112A. They did not.Q. And why did they not?A. Because the material that was installed exceeded the13 design loading that was provided by the contract document and14 incorporated into the truss designs.Trial Transcript, dated March 14, 2017, Vol. 12. (emphasis added). A true and correctcopy of the above excerpt is attached to this Response as Exhibit “26.”39, There is extensive record evidence adduced at trial relating to the deficienciesresulting from KEG’s professional negligence. For example, Paula Barros Peno testified that thedefects in the mansard roof would cause the roof to blow away in the event of a hurricane. Therelevant portion of her trial testimony is as follows:(Page 4185)13 Q_ Ifa window blows out of a home in a14 hurricane, what's the structural significance of15 that?16 A That means that the installation probably17 wasn't per documents.18 Q What is the effect on a home during a19 hurricane when a window blows out?20 A It can damage significantly the house.21 Q_ If there 1s an open area of the roof22 sheathing from, say, where the mansard roof comes up23 like a patio table in a hurricane, what would be the24 effect of wind getting in the underside of the roof?25 A It would probably blow away the roof.Page 20 of 38Trial Transcript, dated March 21, 2017, Vol. 17. (emphasis added). A true and correctcopy of the above excerpt is attached to this Response as Exhibit “27.”AO. Because the Code Plus Letters certified the as-built condition of the residencewhen KEG in fact did not perform the inspections and observations referenced in the Code PlusLetters, KEG automatically fell below the standard of care in authoring the Code Plus Letters.Similar engineers in the community would not certify that something meets or exceeds therequirements of the Florida Building Code, or the Miami Dade wind load requirements, withoutfirst inspecting and observing the items being certified.41. The Second District Court of Appeal made clear and certain in CH2M HillSoutheast, Inc. v. Pinellas County, Florida, 698 So.2d 1238 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) that thelanguage used by the parties governs and creates the standard of care when dealing with anengineer. In this case, the Code Plus Letters unequivocally set the bar for what was required, andthe Code Plus Letters were not true. As set forth by the Second District Court of Appeal,sufficient evidence of the standard of care and its breach were presented and proven at trial. Therole of the Court in addressing a directed verdict motion or an appellate court review in thismatter is not to re-weigh the evidence.IL. Jeff Parzych Presented Evidence that Similar Engineers in the Community WouldNot Write the Code Plus Letters Authored by KEG.42. In its Motion for Judgment in Accordance with Motions for Directed Verdict,KEG admitted that Mr. Parzych, Armour’s expert, in fact testified that he would not have writtenor made the certifications contained in KEG’s Code Plus Letters. Relevant portions of Mr.Parzych’s trial testimony are as follows:y yPage 21 of 38(Page 2706)13 Q. With respect to the letter we had taken you through14 under Exhibit 446 -- do you remember going through that in15 your direct?16 A. Ido.17 Q. And you saw it again on cross-examination?18 A. Yes.19 Q. And is this a letter that you would write as an20 engineer?21 A. Typically, I would not.22 Q. Why not?23 A. I would use terms like “in general conformance,"24 just because of the fact that I'm -- I'm not there 24 hours a25 day watching every single thing that happens.Trial Transcript, dated March 13, 2017, Vol. 11. A true and correct copy of the aboveexcerpt is attached hereto as Exhibit “28.”43. Implicit in Mr. Parzych’s opinion, is that a similar engineer in the communitywould not write Code Plus Letters containing absolute language that the as-built condition of thehome met or exceeded the requirements of the Florida Building Code and the Miami Dade windload requirements.44. Mr. Parzych further testified that similar engineers in the community do not makeguarantees, even after proper inspection, which inspections never occurred in this Case. KEG’sCode Plus Letters are in fact guarantees because the Code Plus Letters contain absolute languageregarding the as-built conditions of the residence. Relevant portions of Mr. Parzych’s trialtestimony are as follows:(Page 2611)3 Q. And, of course, your inspections that were done with4 you and your people would guarantee that everything is done5 perfectly, would it not?6 A. Engineers don't guarantee.7 Q. Engineers don't guarantee. Okay. I just want to8 get that clear.9 So you wouldn't guarantee -- even though you had10 your people out there -- and you trusted your people, didn'tPage 22 of 3811 you?12 A. Yes.Trial Transcript, dated March 13, 2017, Vol. 11. A true and correct copy of theabove excerpt 1s attached hereto as Exhibit “29.”45. Significantly, evidence to support a negligence claim can be “circ*mstantial.”See, Nielsen v. City of Sarasota, 117 So.2d 731, 734 (Fla. 1960) (‘In a civil case, a fact may beestablished by circ*mstantial evidence as effectively and as conclusively as it may be proved bydirect positive evidence.”). Moreover, when presenting evidence relating to the standard of care,one does not need to use the phrase “standard of care.” Edwards vy. Simon, 961 So.2d 973, (Fla.Ath DCA 2007).46. Pursuant to Florida law, the professional practice of engineering is regulated byChapter 471, Florida Statutes. Among various other regulatory requirements set forth in Chapter471, Florida Statutes, Section 471.003(1)(g), Florida Statutes, provides the following grounds fordisciplinary action against an engineer: “[e]ngaging in fraud or deceit, negligence,incompetence, or misconduct, in the practice of engineering.” Rule 61G15—19.001(6)(b),Florida Administrative Code, defines “misconduct” in the practice of engineering to include“misleading in any professional report” or “omitting relevant and pertinent informationfrom such report when the result of such omission would or reasonably could lead to afallacious conclusion on the part of the client, the employer, or the general public.”47. The Code Plus Letters make express certifications and absolute guarantees to Mr.Armour regarding the as-built conditions of the residence, which are based on allegedinspections and observations that Mr. Karins testified at trial never occurred. The recordevidence shows that KEG unequivocally misled Mr. Armour into believing that the inspectionsand observations took place, and the certifications were accurate. The Code Plus LettersPage 23 of 38expressly and clearly state that Mr. Armour could rely on the certifications. Mr. Armour testifiedthat he did in fact rely on the Code Plus Letters.(Page 1006)7 Q. This letter uses the phrase "as-built condition."8 Do you see that?9 A. Yes.10 Q. Italsosays: "Mr. Armour may rely on the11 information contained herein"?12 A. Yes.13 Q. And did [you] rely on it?14 A. Yes.Trial Transcript, dated March 3, 2017, Vol. 5. (emphasis added). A true andcorrect copy of the above excerpt 1s attached hereto as Exhibit “30.”48. | KEG attempts to argue that its conduct falls within the standard of care pertainingto certifications as set forth in the Florida Administrative Code, Rules 61G15-18.11(4) and61G15-29.001. Unequivocally, Rule 61G15-29.001, Florida Administrative Code, subjectsengineers who make false or unsubstantiated certifications to discipline. Relevant portions of theFlorida Administrative Code, Rule 61G15-29.001 provide, in part, as follows:Engineers who sign, date, and seal certification which (a) relateto matters which are beyond the engineer’s technicalcompetence, or (b) involve matters which are beyond theengineer’s scope of services actually provided, or (c) relate tomatters which were not prepared under engineer’s responsiblesupervision, direction, or control; would be subject todiscipline pursuant to subsection 153161G15-19.001(6), F.A.C.(emphasis added).49. Mr. Parzych unequivocally testified that engineers do not make guarantees. Hethen went through all of the things in the Code Plus Letters that were not true. Mr. Karinslikewise testified that the certifications in the Code Plus Letters were not based upon inspectionsor observations referenced in the Code Plus Letters. The jury had ample evidence to concludethat engineers cannot make guarantees, and by providing express guarantees in the Code PlusPage 24 of 38Letters, KEG committed professional negligence. Additionally, KEG made certifications whichwere beyond the scope of services actually performed by KEG.fii. The Court Abused its Discretion by Excluding Jeff Parzych’s Rebuttal TestimonyRelating to the Standard of Care.50. The Trial Court abused its discretion by excluding Jeff Parzych’s rebuttaltestimony regarding the standard of care. Griefer v. DiPietro, 708 So.2d 666, 672 (1998)(“Although a trial court has broad discretion regarding the admissibility of rebuttal testimony, itabuses that discretion when it limits non-cumulative rebuttal testimony that goes to the heart ofthe principal defense.”); and Torres v. Sullivan, 903 So.2d 1064 (2005). The relevant portion ofthe trial transcript provides, in part, as follows:(Page 7103)1] MR. KOESTER: Before the jury does come in, I do12 have one more question for Jeff Parzych I didn't talk13 about yesterday that we thought about last night. And14 since we're going to go in pretty quick succession, I'll15 just go ahead and bring it up now rather than wait for16 him to be on the stand and the jury in the room.17 THE COURT: Go ahead.18 MR. KOESTER: We did want to have Mr. Parzych rebut19 Bracken'‘s statement that the September 29th, 2008, letter20 met the standard of care. I just want to ask him his21 opinion on that. That's it.22 MR. ABATE: He already testified on that.23 THE COURT: And that 1s something that could have24 been asked while he was on the stand. So if he was your25 standard of care expert, that was the point at which to(Page 7104)1 ask him that question.2 MR. KOESTER: The only issue we have is, I mean,3. obviously they involve Slider's can't meet the standard4 of care, Bracken says the letter met the standard of5 care. Bracken said the letter met the standard of care.6 We just want to rebut Bracken's statement on that point.7 MR. ABATE: Your Honor, he asked him that question8 on direct, and he said, Would you have sent this letter,9 and he said, No, I wouldn't have sent this letter. But10 that was as close as he came to any testimony aboutPage 25 of 3811 standard of care, so this isn't new, this isn't12 surprising.13 THE COURT: Iagree. I agree. So obviously my14 voice 1s worse than I thought. So be it.Trial Transcript, dated April 12, 2017, Vol. 31. (emphasis added). A true and correctcopy of the above transcript is attached to this Response as Exhibit “31.”51. The Trial Court precluded Armour from eliciting this information in Armour’scase-in-chief when, with Mr. Parzych on the stand, Mr. Koester put Trial Exhibit 446 on thescreen and asked what conditions in the field were inconsistent with the Code Plus Letters.Relevant portions of the trial transcript provide, in part, as follows:(Page 2601)10 Q. Again, Exhibit 446, have you reviewed this letter,11 sir?12 A. I believe I have, yes.13 MR. ABATE: Your Honor, we'll object to comments on14 this letter. This has been something [J15 THE COURT: I agree. Let's see what the question16 is.17 BY MR. KOESTER:18 Q. Did you find any field investigations ||) well, what19 conditions, if any, did you find in the field inconsistent20 with this letter.21 MR. ABATE: Again, Your Honor, he's now asking for22 the mindset.23 THE COURT: Approach the bench.24 (Bench conference began.)25 THE COURT: If not crossing the line, it comes(Page 2602)1 pretty close. I mean, what's the distinction?2 MR. KOESTER: I'll just stop here then.3. (Bench conference ended.)Trial Transcript, dated March 13, 2017, Vol. 11. (emphasis added) A true and correctcopy of the above excerpt is attached hereto as Exhibit “32.”Page 26 of 3852. In addressing the standard of care issues with Mr. Kobza, the Court agreed thatthose issues were for the jury to decide. Relevant portions of the trial transcript provide, in part,as follows:(Page 3203)19 MR. KOESTER: On my notes I was going to have20 him go through the standard of care. Is that a21 legal issue we are going to be handling with the22 jury instructions? He was going to be our damage23 expert and say the subs fell below the standard of24 care and breached their contract and those kind of25 things. I had him go through the work that each of(Page 3204)1 them did. I'm assuming that's the matter of law2 for jury instruction.3 THE COURT: Yes.4 MR. KOESTER: So I'll skip that.Trial Transcript, dated March 16, 2017, Vol. 14. (emphasis added). A true and correctcopy of the above excerpt 1s attached hereto as Exhibit “33.”53. The Trial Court should have permitted Mr. Parzych’s rebuttal testimony toconfirm what was meant by the words “standard of care,” and to rebut Mr. Bracken’s testimonythat authoring the Code Plus Letters was within the standard of care.54. However, direct testimony on the obvious issue that providing false andunsubstantiated information to people who are relying on that information falls below thestandard of care is not required. We can certainly assume that if this was a case about a doctorwho was being sued for medical malpractice because he knowingly lied in making a diagnosis,there would not be a need for expert testimony regarding the physician’s obligation to tell thetruth.55. The testimony is unequivocal that the contents of the Code Plus Letters were infact not true; therefore, KEG, in authoring the Code Plus Letters, fell below the standard of care.Page 27 of 38The jury had the ability to determine for itself that the Code Plus Letters were false based on theample testimony and evidence presented. This is not a complicated medical malpractice claim orany other type of complicated claim where an expert would be needed to testify that theprofessional involved had an obligation to be honest.56. The record 1s replete with evidence that David Karins and KEG never inspectedor observed the work that the Code Plus Letters certify are properly built. Clearly simularprofessionals in the community would not expressly certify in writing that construction meets orexceeds the requirements of the Florida Building Code, or the Miami Dade wind loadrequirements, without first inspecting or observing the work being certified.57. Expert testimony was presented at trial that similarly situated engineers in thecommunity do not make guarantees and would not have authored the Code Plus Letterscontaining absolute guarantees, since doing so would fall below the standard of care expected ofan engineer. In the Code Plus Letters, KEG makes absolute guarantees and false certifications,both of which violate the standard of care expected of engineers in the community.IV. The Jury Reasonably Concluded that KEG Violated the Florida Building Code58. In its Motion for Judgment in Accordance with Motions for Directed Verdict,KEG argues that KEG, as a designer, can only be held responsible for design defects.59. Conveniently, KEG’s Motion for Judgment in Accordance with Motions forDirected Verdict, as it relates to building code violations, entirely ignores the Code Plus Lettersand the guarantees contained therein, including that the residence was designed and constructedin accordance with the Miami Dade wind loading requirements and in full compliance withFlorida’s Building Code.Page 28 of 3860. The parties to the agreement to build the residence
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Case Number: 23PSCV02269 Hearing Date: August 19, 2024 Dept: G Cross-Defendant MEDG International, Inc.s Demurrer to Cross-Complaint as to Defendant/Cross-Complainant Hirbohd Hedayat Respondent: NO OPPOSITION Cross-Defendant MEDG International, Inc.s Petition to Compel Arbitration as Against Defendant/Cross-Complainant Heda Construction, Inc. Respondent: NO OPPOSITION TENTATIVE RULING Cross-Defendant MEDG International, Inc.s Demurrer to Cross-Complaint as to Defendant/Cross-Complainant Hirbohd Hedayat is SUSTAINED with twenty (20) days leave to amend as to the third (3rd), fourth (4th), and fifth (5th) causes of action and without leave to amend as to the first (1st) and second (2nd) causes of action. Cross-Defendant MEDG International, Inc.s Petition to Compel Arbitration as Against Defendant/Cross-Complainant Heda Construction, Inc. is GRANTED and proceedings are STAYED as to Defendant/Cross-Complainant Heda Construction, Inc. pending the arbitration of Defendant/Cross-Complainant Heda Construction, Inc.s claims. BACKGROUND This is a breach of contract action arising from a credit purchase agreement. In March 2023, Plaintiff Consumers Pipe & Supply Co. (Consumers Pipe) entered into a credit application and sales agreement with Defendant Heda Construction Inc. (Heda Construction) in which Consumers Pipe agreed to extent credit to Heda Construction for the purchase of goods and merchandise. In support of the agreement, Defendant Hirbohd Hedayat executed a personal guaranty. Subsequently, Consumers Pipe alleges Heda Construction and Hedayat failed to make the payments required pursuant to their agreement. On July 26, 2023, Consumers Pipe filed a complaint against Heda Construction, Hedayat, and Does 1-20, alleging the following causes of action: (1) goods sold and delivered, (2) quantum valebant, (3) open book account, (4) account stated, (5) breach of contract, and (6) breach of personal guaranty. On April 4, 2024, Heda Construction and Hedayat filed a cross-complaint against Cross-Defendants MEDG International, Inc. (MEDG) and Does 1-25, alleging the following causes of action: (1) equitable indemnity, (2) contribution, (3) declaratory relief, (4) express indemnity, and (5) breach of written contract. On June 14, 2024, MEDG filed the present demurrer. Prior to filing on June 6, 2024, MEDGs counsel met and conferred telephonically with Hedayats counsel. On June 17, 2024, MEDG filed the present motion to compel arbitration. A hearing on both motions and a case management conference are set for August 19, 2024, with a post-mediation status conference set for November 7, 2024. REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE MEDGs request for the court to take judicial notice of filings in another action before this court is GRANTED pursuant to Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (d). DEMURRER MEDG demurs to Hedayats entire Cross-Complaint. For the following reasons, the court SUSTAINS MEDGs demurrer to Hedayats third, fourth, and fifth causes of action with leave to amend and to Hedayats first and second causes of action without leave to amend. Legal Standard A party may demur to a complaint on the grounds that it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e).) A demurrer tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747 (Hahn).) When considering demurrers, courts accept all well pleaded facts as true. (Fox v. JAMDAT Mobile, Inc. (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1078.) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed. (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905.) The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action. (Hahn, supra, at p. 747.) Indemnity and Contribution (First, Second, and Fourth Causes of Action) MEDG argues Hedayats first cause of action for equitable indemnity and second cause of action for contribution fail because MEDGs alleged liability lies in contract and not tort. (Demurrer, p. 6:8-7:12.) MEDG also argues Hedayats fourth cause of action for express indemnity fails because there are no allegations establishing an express agreement to indemnify Hedayat. (Demurrer, p. 8:11-21.) The court agrees. Legal Standard An indemnitee seeking to recover on an agreement for indemnification must allege the parties' contractual relationship, the indemnitee's performance of that portion of the contract which gives rise to the indemnification claim, the facts showing a loss within the meaning of the parties' indemnification agreement, and the amount of damages sustained. (Four Star Electric, Inc. v. F & H Construction (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1375, 1380.) To state a claim for equitable indemnity, a defendant must allege the same harm for which he may be held liable is properly attributableat least in partto the cross-defendant. (Platt v. Coldwell Banker Residential Real Estate Services (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 1439, 1445, fn.7.) It is well-settled in California that equitable indemnity is only available among tortfeasors who are jointly and severally liable for the plaintiffs injury. (Stop Loss Ins. Brokers, Inc. v. Brown & Toland Medical Group (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1036, 1040.) A claim for contribution requires allegations of (1) a money judgment, (2) rendered jointly against two or more defendants in a tort action, (3) in accordance with the principles of equity, (4) after one tortfeasor has, by payment, discharged the joint judgment or has paid more than his pro rata share thereof, (5) without intentional injury by the tortfeasor. (Code Civ. Proc., § 875, subd. (a)-(d).) Discussion As to the first cause of action for equitable indemnity and second cause of action for contribution, the Cross-Complaint alleges that in the event a judgment is obtained against Hedayat, any damages were contributed to and caused by MEDGs alleged negligence or fault. (Cross-Complaint, ¶ 18, 22.) But the Cross-Complaint fails to establish how MEDG qualifies as a joint tortfeasor with Hedayat as the underlying claims brought by Consumers Pipe are founded in breach of contract and do not allege any torts. Because there are no allegations that establish how MEDG could be held liable as a joint tortfeasor, Hedayats claims of equitable indemnity and contribution are without merit. And in the fourth cause of action for express indemnity, the Cross-Complaint fails to allege the existence and terms of an express indemnity agreement and instead alleges equitable indemnity. (Cross-Complaint, ¶ 29.) Accordingly, MEDGs demurrer to these causes of action is SUSTAINED without leave to amend as to the first and second causes of action and with leave to amend as to the fourth cause of action. Declaratory Relief (Third Cause of Action) MEDG contends Hedayats third cause of action for declaratory relief fails because it is an attempt to redress past wrongs rather than declare future rights. (Demurrer, p. 7:15-8:8.) The court agrees in part. Legal Standard To qualify for declaratory relief, a party would have to demonstrate its action presented two essential elements: (1) a proper subject of declaratory relief, and (2) an actual controversy involving justiciable questions relating to the partys rights or obligations. (Jolley v. Chase Home Finance, LLC (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 872, 909, quotation marks and brackets omitted.) The courts do not issue advisory opinions about the rights and duties of the parties under particular agreements, if no actual, justiciable controversy has yet developed. (Otay Land Co. v. Royal Indemnity Co. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 556, 563.) Discussion In contending declaratory relief is improper, MEDG cites Jolley v. Chase Home Finance, LLC (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 872, 909-910 (Jolley). There, the court noted [d]eclaratory relief generally operates prospectively to declare future rights, rather than to redress past wrongs. [Citations.] It serves to set controversies at rest before they lead to repudiation of obligations, invasion of rights or commission of wrongs. In short, the remedy is to be used in the interests of preventive justice, to declare rights rather than execute them. (Id., at p. 909.) The court held summary adjudication that denied a request for declaratory relief was proper because the controversy involved a fully matured cause of action for money. (Id., at p. 909-910.) But while MEDG seizes on this language to suggest Hedayats cause of action is improper, the court in Jolley also noted [t]he undisputed facts show that loan modification negotiations did not result in a written instrument or contract under which the parties rights need to be declared. (Id., at p. 909.) Unlike Jolley, the present action does involve allegations of express indemnity and breach of written agreement. Thus, there is a present controversy that requires a declaration of MEDG and Hedayats rights with regards to their alleged subcontractor agreement and any claim for express indemnity. To the extent this request for declaratory relief fails, it does so only because the underlying causes of action for express indemnity and breach of written contract are insufficiently pled. Accordingly, MEDGs demurrer to this cause of action is SUSTAINED with leave to amend. Breach of Written Contract (Fifth Cause of Action) MEDG maintains Hedayats fifth cause of action for breach of written contract fails is insufficiently pled. The court agrees. Legal Standard To state a cause of action for breach of contract, a plaintiff must be able to establish (1) the existence of the contract, (2) plaintiffs performance or excuse for nonperformance, (3) defendants breach, and (4) the resulting damages to the plaintiff. (Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman (2011) 51 Cal.4th 811, 821.) If a breach of contract claim is based on alleged breach of a written contract, the terms must be set out verbatim in the body of the complaint or a copy of the written agreement must be attached and incorporated by reference. (Harris v. Rudin, Richman & Appel (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 299, 307.) In some circ*mstances, a plaintiff may also plead the legal effect of the contract rather than its precise language. (Construction Protective Services, Inc. v. TIG Specialty Ins. Co. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 189, 198-199.) [T]he vital elements of a cause of action based on contract are mutual assent (usually accomplished through the medium of an offer and acceptance) and consideration. (Division of Labor Law Enforcement v. Transpacific Transportation Co. (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 268, 275.) Discussion In this case, the Cross-Complaint alleges Cross-Complainants, which includes Heda Construction and Hedayat, entered into a subcontractor agreement with MEDG. (Cross-Complaint, ¶ 31.) While MEDG maintains the Cross-Complaint fails to identify exactly who entered into the subcontractor agreement with MEDG (Demurrer, p. 8:24-9:2), the court finds this allegation is sufficient to establish the identities of the parties. MEDG also maintains it is unclear if the subcontractor agreement alleged here is the same one at issue in a separate action brought by Heda Construction. (Demurrer, p. 9:3-18.) But this contention raises a more elemental issue in that the Cross-Complaint fails to provide a copy of the agreement or allege its verbatim terms as required when alleging a cause of action for breach of a written contract. Accordingly, MEDGs demurrer to this cause of action is SUSTAINED with leave to amend. MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION MEDG petitions to compel Heda Construction to binding arbitration. For the following reasons, the court GRANTS MEDGs petition. Legal Standard A written agreement to submit to arbitration an existing controversy or a controversy thereafter arising is valid, enforceable and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist for the revocation of any contract. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.) The court must grant a petition to compel arbitration unless it finds no written agreement to arbitrate exists, the right to compel arbitration has been waived, grounds exist for revocation of the agreement, or litigation is pending that may render the arbitration unnecessary or create conflicting rulings on common issues. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.2.) A petition to compel arbitration functions as a motion. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1290.2.) In a motion or petition to compel arbitration, the moving party bears the burden of producing prima facie evidence of a written agreement to arbitrate the controversy. (Gamboa v. Northeast Community Clinic (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 158, 165 (Gamboa).) Once the court finds an arbitration agreement exists, the party opposing arbitration bears the burden of establishing a defense to enforcement by preponderance of the evidence. (Rosenthal v. Great Western Fin. Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 413.) In interpreting an arbitration agreement, courts apply the same principles used to interpret contractual provisions with the fundamental goal of giving effect to the parties mutual intentions and applying contractual language if clear and explicit. (Valencia v. Smyth (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 153, 177.) Because public policy strongly favors arbitration, any doubts regarding the arbitrability of a dispute are resolved in favor of arbitration. (Coast Plaza Doctors Hosp. v. Blue Cross of California (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 677, 686.) The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) applies to contracts that involve interstate commerce (9 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2), but since arbitration is a matter of contract, the FAA also applies if stated in the agreement. (See Victrola 89, LLC v. Jaman Properties 8 LLC¿(2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 337, 355.) Pursuant to the FAA, the courts role is limited to determining (1) whether a valid agreement to arbitrate exists and, if it does, (2) whether the agreement encompasses the dispute at issue. (Philadelphia Indemnity Ins. Co. v. SMG Holdings, Inc. (2019) 44 Cal.App.5th 834, 840, quoting U.S. ex rel. Welch v. My Left Foot Childrens Therapy, LLC (9th Cir. 2017) 871 F.3d 791, 796.) Discussion In this case, the Cross-Complaint alleges Hedayat, Heda Construction, and MEDG entered into a subcontractor agreement in July 2022 as part of a construction project for commercial property in Los Angeles. (Cross-Complaint, ¶ 8.) Subsequently, MEDG allegedly breached the subcontractor agreement by (1) failing to meet stipulated completion deadlines, (2) exhibiting sub-par project management practices, and (3) neglecting to pay Hedayat and Heda Construction for their work. (Cross-Complaint, ¶ 9.) The Cross-Complaint alleges MEDGs breaches caused Hedayat and Heda Construction to become indebted to Consumers Pipe. (Cross-Complaint, ¶ 11-14.) Here, MEDG argues Heda Constructions action is subject to an arbitration provision that was included in the July 2022 subcontract agreement. Specifically, they point to paragraph twenty-three which reads as follows in relevant part: Any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this SUBCONTRACT, or the breach thereof, shall be settled by arbitration administered by the AAA (American Arbitration Association). The place of arbitration shall be Los Angeles County, California. California law shall apply. Judgment on the award rendered by arbitrator(s) may be entered in any court having jurisdiction thereof. . . . (Petition, Ex. 2, ¶ XXIII.) Based on this provision, the court finds Heda Constructions claim that MEDG breached the subcontract agreement by failing to make payments owed is a matter arising out of the subcontract agreement and must be submitted to arbitration. And the same goes for Heda Constructions other claims against MEDG as they all arise out of or relate to MEDGs alleged breach of the subcontract agreement. Furthermore, in a separate action brought by Heda Construction against MEDG for the same alleged breach, Heda Construction stipulated to arbitration. (See RJN, Attach. B.) The court notes that Heda Construction failed to timely oppose this petition. Accordingly, because MEDG has established Heda Constructions claims are subject to an arbitration provision and Heda Construction failed to establish any defense to the enforcement of that provision, MEDGs petition is GRANTED. CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, MEDGs demurrer to Hedayats Cross-Complaint is SUSTAINED with twenty (20) days leave to amend as to the third (3rd), fourth (4th), and fifth (5th) causes of action and without leave to amend as to the first (1st) and second (2nd) causes of action. Furthermore, MEDGs petition to compel arbitration is GRANTED and proceedings are STAYED as to Heda Construction pending the arbitration of Heda Constructions claims.
Ruling
AMERICAN EXPRESS NATIONAL BANK VS FARLINDA R KWANIN
Aug 16, 2024 |21GDCV00230
Case Number: 21GDCV00230 Hearing Date: August 16, 2024 Dept: 3 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - NORTHEAST DISTRICT AMERICAN EXPRESS NATIONAL BANK, Plaintiff(s), vs. FARLINDA R. KWANIN, aka KANUNG KWANIN, aka KANUNG K VIRIYAPUNT, Defendant(s). ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) CASE NO.: 21GDCV00230 [TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: MOTION FOR ORDER VACATING DISMISSAL AND ENTERING JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO C.C.P. § 664.6 Dept. 3 8:30 a.m. August 16, 2024 Plaintiff American Express National Bank (Plaintiff) filed this action against defendant Farlinda R. Kwanin aka Kanung Kwanin aka Kanung K. Viriyapunt (Defendant) on February 18, 2021. On November 15, 2021, the action was dismissed based on a stipulation between the parties. On June 5, 2024, Plaintiff filed this motion for an order vacating the dismissal and entering a stipulated judgment in its favor and against Defendant in the amount of $19.457.19. If parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties outside the presence of the court or orally before the court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement. If requested by the parties, the court may retain jurisdiction over the parties to enforce the settlement until performance in full of the terms of the settlement. (Code Civ. Proc., § 664.6.) In hearing a section 664.6 motion, the trial court may receive evidence, determine disputed facts, and enter terms of a settlement agreement as a judgment. (Bowers v. Raymond J. Lucia Companies, Inc. (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 724, 732.) The stipulation on file sets forth a monthly payment plan. Defendants failure to make payments on time will result in Defendant being placed in default under the stipulation. If Defendant fails to cure the default, Plaintiff may obtain a judgment for the entire balance owed by Defendant in the amount of $34,900, plus court costs, less any payments made to date. (11/15/2021 Stip., ¶ 2.) Plaintiff argues that it is entitled to a judgment of $19,457.19. Defendant stopped making payments as required under the stipulation and $19,380 of the principal remains unpaid. (Keith Decl., ¶¶ 8-10, 12.) A memorandum of costs shows that Plaintiff has also incurred $77.19 in costs. The motion is unopposed and it is undisputed that Defendant is in default of the parties stipulation. Accordingly, Plaintiffs motion is GRANTED and the Court vacates the dismissal and enters judgment against Defendant in the amount of $19,457.19. Moving party to give notice. Dated this 16th day of August 2024 William A. Crowfoot Judge of the Superior Court Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at ALHDEPT3@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. Please be advised that if you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter. Unless you receive a submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others might appear at the hearing to argue. If the Court does not receive emails from the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar.
Ruling
Discover Bank vs. Williams
Aug 14, 2024 |23CV-0202823
DISCOVER BANK VS. WILLIAMSCase Number: 23CV-0202823This matter is on calendar for review regarding status of judgment/dismissal. No dismissal is on file. The matterresolved at the Mandatory Settlement Conference on April 29, 2024. Since resolving, no Notice of Settlementhas been filed. No Stipulation regarding a dismissal pursuant to CCP § 664.6 has been filed. This matter waspreviously continued to permit the parties to take the necessary steps to result in a closure of the court file priorto today’s hearing. Nothing further has been filed. An appearance is necessary on today’s calendar to providethe Court with a status of judgement/dismissal. Failure to appear will result in the issuance of an Order toShow Cause Re Monetary Sanctions.
Ruling
2024CUEN025537 HEIDI KERR vs THOMAS KERR
Aug 13, 2024 |Benjamin F. Coats |Motion to Vacate Judgment on Sister-State Judgment and Opposition to Entry of Judgment |2024CUEN025537
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF VENTURA Tentative Ruling 2024CUEN025537: HEIDI KERR vs THOMAS KERR 08/13/2024 in Department 43 Motion to Vacate Judgment on Sister-State Judgment and Opposition to Entry of JudgmentThe morning calendar in courtroom 43 will normally begin at 8:45. Please arrive for your hearingno later than 8:30 a.m. The door will be opened before the calendar is called.The Court allows appearances by CourtCall and Zoom, but parties must both use the same platformif appearing remotely. The court’s equipment is not capable of handling mixed remoteappearances. Counsel are expected to cooperate in this regard. Refer to the Courtroom 43 webpagefor more information about remote appearances.If appearing by CourtCall, call in no later than 8:30 a.m. If you wish to appear by CourtCall, youmust make arrangements with CourtCall by 4:00 p.m. the court day before your scheduled hearing.Requests for approval of a CourtCall appearance made on the morning of the hearing will not begranted. No exceptions will be made.For Zoom appearances, you must email the court at Courtroom43@ventura.courts.ca.gov with asimultaneous copy to all other counsel/self-represented parties no later than 3:00 p.m. the courtday before the hearing. INCLUDE THE PHRASE "ZOOM APPEARANCE ON (DATE OFHEARING)" IN THE SUBJECT LINE OF YOUR EMAIL. You will receive the login informationfor your appearance in reply to your email. If appearing by Zoom, log into the hearing no laterthan 8:30 a.m. The Court will transfer you to the meeting room when your matter is called.Additional instructions can be found on the Courtroom 43 webpage. IF YOU DO NOT FOLLOWALL OF THESE INSTRUCTIONS, YOU WILL NOT BE PERMITTED TO APPEAR BYZOOM AT THE HEARING. NO EXCEPTIONS WILL BE ALLOWED.With respect to the tentative ruling below, no notice of intent to appear is required. If you wish tosubmit on the tentative ruling you can fax notice to Judge Coats's secretary, Ms. McIntyre at 805-477-5894, stating that you submit on the tentative. Or, you may emailCourtroom43@ventura.courts.ca.gov with all counsel copied on the email. Do not call in lieu ofsending a fax or email. If you submit on the tentative without appearing and the opposing partyappears, the hearing will be conducted in your absence. If you are the moving party and do notcommunicate to the Court that you submit on the tentative or you do not appear at the hearing, theCourt may deny your motion irrespective of the tentative.Unless stated otherwise at the hearing, if a formal order is required but not signed at the hearing,the prevailing party shall prepare a proposed order and comply with CRC 3.1312 subdivisions (a),(b), (d) and (e). The signed order shall be served on all parties and a proof of service filed with thecourt. A "notice of ruling" in lieu of this procedure is not authorized.Motion: Defendant Thomas Kerr’s motion to vacate judgment. 2024CUEN025537: HEIDI KERR vs THOMAS KERRTentative Ruling: The motion is DENIED without prejudice. There is no evidence that thejudgment debtor gave notice of the hearing. Furthermore, the motion lacks a legal basis and is notsupported by admissible evidence. The motion is in the form of an objection and consistspredominantly of unsupported arguments which should properly have been addressed by the courtissuing the original judgment.“Article IV, section 1 of the United States Constitution states that ‘[f]ull Faith and Credit shall begiven in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.’ Forjudgments, ‘the full faith and credit obligation is exacting.’ [Citation]. Pursuant to thisconstitutional mandate, ‘[a] final judgment in one State, if rendered by a court with adjudicatoryauthority over the subject matter and persons governed by the judgment, qualifies for recognitionthroughout the land.’ [Citation].” (Casey v. Hill (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 937, 958–959).“Upon a claim that a foreign judgment is not entitled to full faith and credit, inquiry into the legalityof proceedings in a court of a sister state is narrowly circ*mscribed by case law. The permissiblescope of inquiry upon such a parry is limited to whether the court of rendition has ‘fundamental’jurisdiction (see generally Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal, 17 Cal.2d 280, 288-291, 109 P.2d942). In other words, a judgment entered by one state must be recognized by another state if thestate of rendition had jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter and all interested partieswere given reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard. [Citations].” (Thorley v. SuperiorCourt (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 900, 907).The clerk shall file this decision and serve notice of the Court’s ruling.
Ruling
Rocky Top Rentals LLC vs. Vannormanerickson, et al.
Aug 14, 2024 |23CVG-00452
AL.Case Number: 23CVG-00452This matter is on calendar for review regarding status of the case. Proof of service of the summonsand complaint is on file for Defendant Ely Vannormanerickson. Defendant Arnold Erickson hasfiled an Answer, however, the proof of service filed along with Defendant Erickson’s Answer isincomplete. It does not name an individual served at Item 5. The parties are ordered to appeartoday to discuss service of Mr. Erickson’s Answer and trial setting if appropriate.
Ruling
STARSTONE NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY vs MOTT
Aug 12, 2024 |Frank Anthony Moschetti |CVCO2303927
MOTION TO RECLASSIFY FROM LIMITEDSTARSTONE NATIONALCVCO2303927 TO UNLIMITED BY STARSTONE NATIONALINSURANCE VS MOTTINSURANCETentative Ruling: No tentative ruling will be issued.
Ruling
Discover Bank vs. Williams
Aug 16, 2024 |23CV-0202823
DISCOVER BANK VS. WILLIAMSCase Number: 23CV-0202823This matter is on calendar for review regarding status of judgment/dismissal. No dismissal is on file. The matterresolved at the Mandatory Settlement Conference on April 29, 2024. Since resolving, no Notice of Settlementhas been filed. No Stipulation regarding a dismissal pursuant to CCP § 664.6 has been filed. This matter waspreviously continued to permit the parties to take the necessary steps to result in a closure of the court file priorto today’s hearing. Nothing further has been filed. An appearance is necessary on today’s calendar to providethe Court with a status of judgement/dismissal. Failure to appear will result in the issuance of an Order toShow Cause Re Monetary Sanctions.
Ruling
Discover Bank vs. Williams
Aug 12, 2024 |23CV-0202823
DISCOVER BANK VS. WILLIAMSCase Number: 23CV-0202823This matter is on calendar for review regarding status of judgment/dismissal. No dismissal is on file. The matterresolved at the Mandatory Settlement Conference on April 29, 2024. Since resolving, no Notice of Settlementhas been filed. No Stipulation regarding a dismissal pursuant to CCP § 664.6 has been filed. This matter waspreviously continued to permit the parties to take the necessary steps to result in a closure of the court file priorto today’s hearing. Nothing further has been filed. An appearance is necessary on today’s calendar to providethe Court with a status of judgement/dismissal. Failure to appear will result in the issuance of an Order toShow Cause Re Monetary Sanctions.
Document
AMERICAN EXPRESS NATIONAL BANK vs TKACHUK, OLEG
Aug 13, 2024 |UZABEL, MARYANN OLSON |Contract and Indebtedness - $15,001 to $30,000 |Contract and Indebtedness - $15,001 to $30,000 |2024 CC 005346 NC
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ABC SUPPLY CO INC vs 911 ROOFING AND RESTORATION INC
Aug 15, 2024 |QUARTERMAINE, ERIKA N. |Contract and Indebtedness $15,001 to $30,000 (South County) |Contract and Indebtedness $15,001 to $30,000 (South County) |2024 CC 005396 SC
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AMERICAN EXPRESS NATIONAL BANK vs TKACHUK, OLEG
Aug 13, 2024 |UZABEL, MARYANN OLSON |Contract and Indebtedness - $15,001 to $30,000 |Contract and Indebtedness - $15,001 to $30,000 |2024 CC 005346 NC
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COUDRAY, DANIELLE vs TRENT, KRISTY
Aug 13, 2024 |QUARTERMAINE, ERIKA N. |Contract and Indebtedness $15,001 to $30,000 (South County) |Contract and Indebtedness $15,001 to $30,000 (South County) |2024 CC 005356 SC
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LIND, DOUGLAS S vs FIRST PROTECTIVE INSURANCE COMPANY
Aug 15, 2024 |CARROLL, HUNTER W |CONTRACT AND INDEBTEDNESS - CIRCUIT 2010 |CONTRACT AND INDEBTEDNESS - CIRCUIT 2010 |2024 CA 004217 NC
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COUDRAY, DANIELLE vs TRENT, KRISTY
Aug 13, 2024 |QUARTERMAINE, ERIKA N. |Contract and Indebtedness $15,001 to $30,000 (South County) |Contract and Indebtedness $15,001 to $30,000 (South County) |2024 CC 005356 SC
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Aug 13, 2024 |CARROLL, HUNTER W |FOREIGN JUDGMENT - CIRCUIT 2010 |FOREIGN JUDGMENT - CIRCUIT 2010 |2024 CA 004174 NC
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CREDIT ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION vs AGARRATT, DEVICA
Aug 12, 2024 |QUARTERMAINE, ERIKA N. |Contract and Indebtedness $15,001 to $30,000 (South County) |Contract and Indebtedness $15,001 to $30,000 (South County) |2024 CC 005312 SC